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Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), this paper studies productivity dispersions in 
Colombian industrial establishments using the Colombian Annual Manufacturing 
Survey (AMS) from 1982 to 1998. The United States is used as a benchmark to 
estimate the reallocation of capital and labor to equalize marginal products across 
plants in Colombia. Gains are found in manufacturing Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) of approximately 3-8 percent and TPF is positively correlated with 
exporting status, age, size, and location in the central region of the country. There 
is also suggestive evidence that opening the economy in 1991 is associated with 
an increase in plant productivity levels for firms that export goods.  The 1990 
reform that reduced dismissal costs is associated with an increase in productivity, 
while the reform that increased labor costs in 1993 is associated with a decrease in 
plants’ productivity.  Further work is needed to establish a causal relation between 
productivity and policy changes. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) develop a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms to 
show the effect of resource misallocation on aggregate productivity. Using data on establishments 
they find evidence of resource misallocation and consequent effects on aggregate total factor 
productivity (TFP) in China and India. This paper applies their methodology using Colombian 
industrial establishment data from the Annual Manufacturing Survey (AMS) from 1982 to 1998. 
When misallocation of capital and labor across plants in Colombia is hypothetically changed to 
the level of the United States, Colombia’s manufacturing TFP increases between 3 percent and 8 
percent. These gains are small compared to 30-50 percent and 40-60 percent reported by Hsieh 
and Klenow for China and India, respectively. 
Firm-level regressions show that Total Factor Productivity related to “physical 
productivity”
2 (TPFQ) is positively correlated with exporting status, age, size, and location in the 
central region of the country. When relating distortions to policy changes in Colombia, we show 
a positive correlation between TFPQ and labor sector reforms, but emphasize the need for further 
work to establish a causal relation. We hypothetically reallocate resources by equalizing Total 
Factor Productivity related to “revenue productivity” (TFPR) across plants and within industries. 
The aggregate TFP gains that would result are between 47-55 percent. When comparing actual 
firm size to the size observed if TFPR were equalized across plants and within industries, we find 
that Colombia should have fewer mid-size plants and more small and large ones. We conduct 
several robustness checks by varying the parameter of elasticity of substitution between plant 
value added and the source of the labor and output shares. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2 we provide background 
information on trade labor market and financial reforms that took place during the period we 
study. Section 3 describes the panel dataset used in the analysis and the NBER-CES 
Manufacturing Industry Database used to calculate U.S. labor shares. Section 4 provides details 
about the methodology used to derive the empirical results. Section 5 starts with descriptive 
statistics, then provides the empirical findings with robustness checks, and ends with an 
assessment of the possibility of measurement error in the plant revenue and inputs variables. 
Section 6 shows how TFPQ and TFPR relate to different firms’ characteristics and to how their 
                                                           
2 The use of plant-specific deflator yields TFPQ, which is commonly denoted as “physical productivity,” whereas 
using and industry deflator gives TFPR, which is known as “revenue productivity.”  See Foster, Haltiwanger and 
Syverson (2008) for details. 
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 dispersion relates to the timing of trade and labor policies. Section 7 summarizes the main 
findings and concludes. 
 
2.  Background 
During the early 1980s there were several reforms that increased effective protection.
3  Eslava et 
al. (2009) report that the average tariff level in 1984 was 27 percent, but there was variation 
across industries.  In particular, they find that the average tariff protection in manufacturing rose 
to 50 percent during this period. Esguerra and Villar (2006) show that in 1985 the tariff schedule 
increased by 16 percent. During the second half of the 1980s there was a reduction in trade 
barriers, while trade liberalization reforms started in the first half of the 1990s.  Trade reforms 
further reduced tariffs, resulting in effective protection rates falling from 62.5 percent to 26.6 
percent between 1990 and 1991 (Edwards, 2001). Between 1991 and 1992 the average tariff level 
was 11 percent (Ocampo and Villar, 1992). 
In 1991 a new Constitution gave independence to the Central Bank and introduced 
municipal decentralization. One of the most important reforms of that decade took place in 1993, 
when Law 100 amended the social security systems. This system went from pay-as-you-go to a 
fully-funded system with individual accounts, (see, e.g., Kugler and Kugler, 2009).  The law also 
created a contributive health insurance regime, increasing contributions for health and pensions 
through employment by 10 percentage points from 1992 to 1996. 
In the early 1990s Colombia started a broad process of economic and political reforms in 
areas including employment policies, social security, financial markets and trade. A main goal of 
the reforms was to achieve greater flexibility in the labor market. Law 50 of December 1990 
modified severance payments savings accounts and reduced dismissal costs between 60 percent 
and 80 percent (see, e.g., Kugler, 1999 and 2005). In the same year Law 45 eliminated interest 
rate ceilings and requirements to invest in government securities, while lowering reserve 
requirements.  Additional financial sector reforms took place in 1991. First, Law 9 abolished 
exchange controls. Second, financial markets were reinforced according to the Basel Accords. 
Finally, Resolution 49 eliminated restrictions on foreign direct investment (see, e.g., Kugler, 
2006).  A result of these financial reforms was an increase in capital inflows, which benefited the 
economy as a whole and especially the financial sector.  
                                                           
3 See Garay (1998) for a detailed description of trade policies from 1983 to 1985. 
7 
 In summary, labor costs were initially reduced in 1990 by the changes introduced with 
Law 50, but were later increased with the reforms of the health and pension systems as dictated 
by Law 100 of December 1993. Frictions in financial markets were substantially lowered in 1990 
and 1991 by Law 45, Law 9 and Resolution 49. Trade protection increased during the mid 1980s, 
but in 1990 and 1991 trade liberalization started and continued with slower impetus during the 
rest of the decade. 
 
3.  Data 
3.1. Annual Manufacturing Survey in Colombia 1982-1998   
We use the panel created by Eslava et al. (2004) and a recently updated version of the same 
panel, created by the same authors and made available through the National Statistical Agency 
(Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estaditicas, DANE).
4 Both of these panels use the 
Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey (AMS) conducted by DANE starting in 1982 and 
ending in 1998 and 2004, respectively. The AMS is a census of industrial plants with more than 
10 employees, or annual production above 115.5 million pesos (measured in 2005 prices).
5 
For the analysis we use plant information at the 4-digit International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC) level on: employees (production and non-production personnel); output (at 
constant 1982 prices and a price index used to recover the nominal values;
6 capital stock 
(buildings, structures, machinery and equipment); and intermediate consumption (at constant 
1982 prices and using the price index from Eslava et al., 2004).   
The 1998 panel does not include all the variables necessary to replicate Hsieh and Klenow 
(2009), so we use the 2004 panel to obtain additional information on total wage and benefit 
payments.  Major differences in the original and updated panel correspond to the way deflators 
are constructed. We merge both panels using information that does not involve prices (4-digit 
level ISIC, production and non-production personnel, year, energy consumption). We use price 
indexes to reconstruct nominal output and materials, and subtract them to obtain nominal value 
added.  
                                                           
4 Eslava et al. (2004) use this dataset to study productivity and resource allocation in a period of structural reforms in 
Colombia. 
5 This value is adjusted every year using the Producer Price Index. 115.5 million pesos are approximately 
US$58,000. 
6 See Eslava et al. (2004) for details on the construction of price index. 
8 
 As documented by Eslava et al. (2004), the plant capital stock is constructed recursively 
by depreciating the capital stock in the previous year and adding deflated investment. The 
deflator for investments calculated at the 3-digit ISIC code level corresponds to the implicit 
deflator for capital formation from the input-output matrices for 1991-94, and from the output 
utilization matrices for later years. Pombo (1999) calculates different 3-digit ISIC code level 
depreciation rates for buildings and structures, and machinery and equipment. We use these rates 
of depreciation and investment deflators to calculate the nominal capital stock variable.  
To avoid losing firms due to missing values and the recursive method used to construct 
capital stocks, we impute values for machinery and equipment and/or buildings and structures 
when there are positive values for capital stock in previous and subsequent years for a specific 
firm. 
We keep plants that have positive and non-missing values for value added, labor 
compensation and capital stock. For comparability with other studies and to account for the 
possibility of sample selection we restrict the sample to firms with 10 or more employees. We 
conduct the analysis with an unbalanced panel of 83,294 plant-year observations for the period 
between 1982 and 1998. 
 
3.2. NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database  
Data for U.S. labor shares comes from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and 
from the U.S. Census Bureau Center for Economic Studies Manufacturing Industry Database 
(CES). We first match the usSIC code with the ISIC revision 2 Colombian code.  For the ISIC 
codes with more than one corresponding usSIC, we added the payroll and VA, then we calculated 
the labor shares. To assign U.S. labor shares to Colombian plants within 4-digit level ISIC 
sectors, we match usSIC codes to the ISIC Rev 2 codes (Colombian industrial codes). 
 
4. Deriving the Results  
 
Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we set the rental price of capital, R, to 10 percent and the 
elasticity of substitution between plant value added to   3 . This value corresponds closely to 
the Broda, Greenfiled and Weinstein (2006) estimate of   2 . 9  for Colombia. Firm-specific 
capital distortions mean the cost of capital varies across firms according to  1      ,   , where i 
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 denotes the firm and s denotes the industry,    ,  are the capital distortions, or the distortions that 
increase the marginal product of capital relative to the marginal product of labor. 
The production function of each firm i in sector s is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns 
to scale. 
   ,      ,   , 
    , 
                                                        (1) 
We set the elasticity of output with respect to capital in each industry,   , as one minus 
the labor share in the corresponding industry in the United States. This assumes that the U.S. 
shares by industry have less distortion compared to Colombia. In the main results we do not use 
Colombian shares because we need to separately identify the average capital distortion from the 
capital production elasticity by industry. We assume that the capital and labor shares differ by 
industry but not by plant. The capital share is calculated using information from the NBER-CES 
Manufacturing Industry Database from 1982 to 1997. Using the ISIC 3-digit classification for the 
industries in the analysis, U.S. capital shares have a mean value of 38.78, a minimum of 20.77 
and a maximum of 77.56.
7 We report the output and labor shares for Colombia and the United 
States in Appendix Table A1. 
We use the wage bill as labor input, which implies that w=1. We rescale the labor 
compensation and capital stock by 
 
    to take into account rents. We use    ,  to denote 
distortions that affect both marginal product of capital and labor. We can derive firm specific 
distortions and productivity using the following equations from Hsieh and Klenow (2009): 
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7 When computing the alphas we replaced negative values for one sector by missing, since replacing by 0 could 
create problems with other formulas which divide by alpha. 
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 In the data we do not observe    , so we normalize   , = 1. This normalization does not 
affect the results. The marginal revenue products are affected by capital and output distortions in 
the following way: 
  ,    
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    , 
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Substituting      ,  and      ,  in      ,  we get the equation to estimate TFPR at 
the plant level. 
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We calculate TFPR at the industry level using the following equation: 
  
1     , 
1     , 
 




  ,    , 
      
 
  






     , 
   
 
    
 
     , 
  
  ,   , 
     
 
  
     
    
                (9) 
 
where distortions at the industry level are computed using labor compensation, capital stock and 
value added at the industry level. 
      ∑  , 
    
 
                                                               (10) 
 
We trim 2 percent of plant productivity and distortions by cutting values below the 1
st 
percentile and above the 99
th percentile of the distribution of      
     , 
                 and     
  , 
               
 
    . 
Where     corresponds to the number of firms in each industry sector. This corresponds to 
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 excluding approximately 12.8 percent of production. Then we recalculate 




5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The last column of Table 1 shows the number of plants by year. On average there are 4,376 
plants per year. The table also shows the distribution for the number of plants by sector. “Textile, 
apparel and leather industries” is the largest sector, followed by the “Food, beverages and 
tobacco” sector. “Basic metal industries” and “Other manufacturing industries” have the smallest 
share of firms in the panel. Though there are fluctuations in the number of firms over time, the 
distribution of firms across sectors remains relatively constant. 
Table 2 shows the number of firms that enter and exit the panel over time, with the last 
column indicating the net entry. We define entry as a firm that appears in the dataset and is not 
observed in the previous year. Exit corresponds to a firm previously observed that is not observed 
the next year in the dataset. Net entry is calculated as the difference between firms that enter in 
year t minus firms that exit in year t-1. Thus a particular firm can be counted both in the entry and 
the exit column (though not in the same year). On average 479 firms enter each year, while 594 
exit. This corresponds to an average annual entry/exit rate of approximately 11 percent and 14 
percent, respectively, of the plants observed in the panel.  
As reported in the last column of Table 1 from year-to-year the number of plants declines 
slightly, with a more noticeable fall from 1991 to 92, likely due to a change in plant identifiers.
9 
An additional explanation to the drop in number of firms is the aggregate economic cycle. Figure 
1 reports the GDP growth rate and the net entry of firms. The values for this figure are taken from 
column (3) in Table 2. The figure shows a strong correlation between the decline in GDP growth 
during the late 1980s with a decline in the net number of manufacturing firms getting started. 
                                                           
8 We also estimated the results including and adjustment to TFPQ, as defined      , 
          
     , 
   
 
   
, where 
     
   
   
 where    is total nominal value added for sector s. We do not need to adjust TFPR because all of the 
variables are in nominal terms. Specifically, labor is measured as payroll instead of physical units of labor. The main 
findings do not change once we account for the the TFPQ adjustment (not reported). 
 
9 We are able to match the new and old firm identifiers with a dictionary. However despite the dictionary, there were 
some plants that do not match. 
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 This pattern is reversed when the economy recovers in the early 1990s, and on net there is a 
higher number of firms getting started. 
Table 3 shows the number of plants by size categories (measured by the number of 
employees) in 1998. In this cross-section of plants the largest proportion of plants has between 20 
and 49 employees. However, plants with employee size ranging from 100 to 249 have the largest 
share of total employment (24 percent).  
To illustrate how well the panel represents overall economic activity in Colombia, Figure 
2 shows the distribution of labor force by economic activity. We define informal as people who 
are not affiliated to health insurance through employment. The figure uses data from the 1998 
Colombian Household Survey. Among the categories depicted in the graph, only 1.5 percent of 
the labor force reports working in the manufacturing sector, and 54.6 percent work in firms with 
more than 10 employees. Since Colombia’s labor force in 1998 was around 15.3M people, this 
would correspond to approximately 126,476 people in the manufacturing sector working in firms 
with more than 10 employees. This number is smaller than the number we have in our dataset of 
293,108 employees. This could be due to the fact that the Colombian Household Survey includes 
information from only 13 municipalities, while the panel dataset is a census of all manufacturing 
firms with more than 10 employees. 
 
5.2 Empirical Results 
 
Figure 3 plots the distribution of the plant TFPQ relative to the industry TFPQ for 1998. It is 
calculated as     
  , 
              
 
    . This distribution is weighted by the value added share of the 
industry relative to the economy, divided by the number of firms in 1998 in a specific sector. 
Colombia’s TFPQ dispersion is wider than in the United States, China and India as reported by 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and the left tail is thicker. The graph also shows lumps in the left tail, 
indicating the possibility of regulation that encourages firms to stay at a low level of productivity 
rather than expanding or exiting.  
Figure 4 plots the distribution of plant TFPQ relative to industry TFPQ for each year. The 
long left tail is evident in the early 1980s, a period of high trade tariffs. After 1986 the tail 
diminishes. Coinciding with the opening of the economy and the period of liberalization in 1990 
and 1991 the distribution is fairly smooth and more compact. After 1993, the long left tail starts 
to emerge again, with a particularly noticeable lump in 1996 and 1998. 
13 




th percentiles of 
the dispersion of plant TFPQ relative to the industry TFPQ levels, weighted by share of value 
added of the industry relative to the economy, and divided by the number of firms in that specific 
year and sector. The table shows that across years, several measures of dispersion of TFPQ (the 
standard deviation, the differences between the 75
th and 25
th and the 90
th and 10
th percentiles) are 
wider in Colombia than those reported by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for the United States. The 
U.S. standard deviation ranges from 0.79 to 0.85; the 75-25 percentile comparison from 1.09 to 
1.22; and the 90-10 percentile comparison from 2.05 to 2.22. For Colombia these numbers are 
1.60 to 2.43 for the standard deviation range; the 75-25 percentile comparison from 2.32 to 2.83; 
and the 90-10 percentile comparison from 4.37 to 6.14 
Figure 5 plots the distribution of plant TFPR relative to industry TFPR for 1998. It is 
calculated as     
     , 
                . This distribution is weighted by the value added share of the industry 
relative to the economy, divided by the number of firms in 1998 in a specific sector. The 
Colombian TFPR dispersion is much wider than the U.S. dispersion and shows lumps in the left 
tail, again consistent with policies that favor inefficient plants. Figure 6 provides more detail by 
plotting the distribution of the plant TFPR relative to the industry TFPR by year. The dispersion 
in plant TFPR is large in the early 1980s, and it increases notably in 1986 and after 1993.  




th percentiles of 
the dispersion of plant TFPR relative to the industry TFPR levels, weighted by share of value 
added of the industry with respect to the economy, divided by the number of firms in that specific 
year and sector. The U.S. values reported by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for the standard deviation 
of TFPR range from 0.41 to 0.49. The corresponding values for Colombia are from 0.84 to 1.64. 
The first column of Table 5 shows the proportion of TFP gains from equalizing TFPR 
across plants within industries as: 100 
          
   1      where 
 
          
  ∏  ∑  
  ,                 
               , 
 
   
  
     
  
   
 
    , and    corresponds to a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of 
products by industry   ∏    
  
  . To ensure that ∑     1    we calculate    as the industry’s share 
of value added. Using U.S. labor shares and Colombian output shares (   , column (1) in Table 5 
shows that aggregate manufacturing TFP would increase by 47-55 percent with full liberalization. 
Using Colombian output shares and equalizing Colombian labor shares within each 
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 manufacturing sector results in an average increase of approximately 80 percent, as shown in 
column (2). 
Table 6 shows how firms’ size, measured as value added, would change if TFPR were 
equalized. The rows are actual plant size quartiles, and the columns correspond to the ratio of 
efficient plant size relative to actual size. From this efficient to actual size ratio we create four 
categories: 0-50 percent (the plant should reduce its reduce its size at least by 50 percent), 50-100 
percent, 100-200 percent, and more than 200 percent (the plant should increase in size by at least 
doubling). For all except the bottom quartile, the highest percentages are in the 200+% column, 
indicating that the medium and large size firms should increase their plant size. 
Figure 7 plots the efficient and the actual size distribution of plants in 1998. We calculate 
the efficient level of output as    ,            
          
  
 
   
  , 
    , 
     to compare it to the actual level of 
output given by    ,        ,    ,  
 
   . The hypothetical distribution is more dispersed than the 
actual distribution. In particular it shows a larger concentration of firms in the left and right tails. 
This indicates that there should be fewer mid-sized plants and more small and large ones.
10 This 
result—that the efficient distribution has a wider variance than the actual distribution—is  
consistent across years, as depicted in Figure 8. 
Column (1) in Table 7 reports the proportion of TFP gains in Colombia relative to those in 
the United States in 1997, the period where the United States reports the largest gains. If 
Colombia moved to U.S. efficiency, TFP would increase between 3-8 percent. We find no 
evidence of improved allocations in Colombia from 1982 to 1998, which is what Hsieh and 
Klenow find for India. The implied decline in allocative efficiency is of 1 percent or 0.1 percent 




In this section we provide robustness results to the estimates obtained. In particular we vary the 
elasticity of substitution and the source of output and labor shares. Columns (2)-(4) of Table 5 
show robustness results for the proportion of TFP gains from equalizing TFPR across plants 
within industries. Column (2) uses Colombian labor and output shares, while column (3) uses 
                                                           
10 However, it is important to keep in mind the sample restrictions in the panel which exclude most plants with less 
than 10 employees. 
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 U.S. shares for both. These results help assess the effects of industrial composition on measures 
of misallocation. Using Colombian labor and output shares increases the gains from equalizing 
TFPR within industries, while using U.S. labor and output shares results in more modest gains 
from equalizing TFPR within industries. In column (4) we increase the elasticity of substitution 
between plant value added from 3 to 5, finding an increase of 80 percent with full liberalization. 
It is worth noting that Broda, Greenfield and Weinstein (2006) report estimates of the elasticity of 
substitution among different varieties of a good to be equal to 2.9 in Colombia. 
In Table 7 column (2) we show the results for the proportion of TFP gains in Colombia 
relative to those in the United States. In 1997 increasing the elasticity of substitution between 
value added from 3 to 5. By increasing   to 5 we find that manufacturing TFP in Colombia 
would range from -0.9 percent and 9.0 percent. 
 
5.4 Assessment of Measurement Error 
 
To explore the impact that classical measurement error in plant revenue and inputs may have in 
the Colombian estimates, we regress revenues on inputs as: 
log 
      
     
 
           log 
   
     
    
  
    
                                                  (11) 
 
We also regress inputs on revenues as: 
log 
   
     
    
  
    
    
 
            log 
      
     
                                             (12) 
 
Each regression includes weights derived from the share of value added of the industry 
over the whole economy, divided by the number of firms in that specific year and sector. Results 
are reported in Table 8. The table shows that the elasticity of inputs with respect to revenue is 
0.92 in Colombia, relative to 1.01 in the United States. Assuming that the true elasticities are the 
same in all countries, the results suggest that classical measurement error might add 9 percent of 
the variance of log revenue in Colombia. The table also shows that the elasticity of revenue with 
respect to inputs is 0.95 in Colombia, and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) report that the corresponding 
U.S. elasticity is 0.82, indicating that classical measurement error actually lower the variance in 
Colombia by 16 percent relative to the U.S. Assuming that there is no correlation in the 
16 
 percentage errors in revenues and inputs, together these results indicate that greater classical 
measurement error in Colombia do not appear to contribute to the higher variance of TFPR. 
If, like Hsieh and Klenow, we assume that the serial correlation in measurement error for 
a given plant is lower than the true correlation for revenue and inputs, and that the true 
correlations are the same across countries, then we should find that the growth rates in revenue 
and inputs varies more in Colombian plants than in U.S. plants. In Table 9 we test whether 
growth rates of revenue and inputs vary more across plants in Colombia than in the United States. 
First, we create the percentage growth of the firm value added, and the percentage growth of the 
sector value added. Then we compare the difference in variation of the firm with respect to the 
industry. This calculation is weighted by the share of value added of the industry over the whole 
economy, divided by the number of firms in that specific year and sector. Table 9 shows that the 
results provide mixed evidence on whether TFPR has more measurement error in Colombia than 
in the United States, because input growth varies less but revenue growth varies more in 
Colombia than in the United States. 
To summarize, the results in this section test for evidence of classical measurement error 
in plant revenue and inputs in Colombia. Under the assumptions that the elasticities in revenue 
and inputs are the same across countries, and that measurement error is likely to have less serial 
correlation than the true values, we find mixed evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
measurement error could be driving the higher TFPR variance observed in Colombia relative to 
the United States. 
 
6. Additional Results 
 
In this section we show how TFPQ and TFPR dispersion relate to policy changes; and how it 
correlates to different firm and geographical characteristics. 
Figure 9 shows TFPQ and TFPR dispersion over time with vertical lines indicating the 
timing of labor reforms. The dashed blue line in 1990 corresponds to Law 50, which reduced 
dismissal costs, while the red line indicates Law 100, which increased contributions for health 
and pensions through employment. Figure 10 shows TFPQ and TFPR dispersion over time with 
vertical lines indicating the timing of trade and financial sector reforms. The reforms in the early 
1980s correspond to an increase in trade barriers (see Eslava et al., 2009; Esguerra and Villar, 
2006; and Garay, 1998). The 1991 reform corresponds to La Apertura, or the opening of the 
17 
 economy, which brought a rapid acceleration of tariff reductions and elimination of import 
licenses (Edwards, 2001). After the passing of Law 50 we see an immediate decline in TFP 
dispersion, but the declining trend is reversed in 1991, the year when many of the trade 
liberalization reforms were passed. This upward trend in TFP dispersion continues after the 
passing of Law 100, which increased labor costs. 
Next, we look at how the timing of the labor market, trade and financial reforms coincides 
with the changes in labor and capital over time. Table 10 shows the change for capital and labor 
across years. In the early 1980s during the period of high trade barriers, labor decreases. In the 
late 1980s and after the 1990 reform, which reduced dismissal costs, labor increases. After the 
1993 reform, which increased employment contributions, labor grows at slower rates or even 
decreases. 
Regressions using an indicator for the year of the reform and after are reported  in Table 
11. For the regressions shown in Table 11 and in Table 12 the dependent variable is defined as 
the firm's log TFPR or TFPQ relative to the industry TFPR or TFPQ. Columns (1) of Table 11 
show that firms that produce products for export are more productive, and that the opening of the 
economy in 1991 is associated with an increase in plant productivity levels for firms that export 
goods. Column 2 verifies that there is no increase in average productivity given the 1991 reform. 
Column (3) control for the years in which the labor reforms were passed. The reform that reduced 
dismissal costs in 1990 is associated with an increase in productivity, while the reforms that 
increased labor costs in 1993 are associated with a decrease in plants’ productivity. 
In Column (1) of Table 12 we regress the sector TFPQ on an indicator of whether or not 
the firm produces products for export. The results shown in column (1) are positive and 
significant, indicating that firms that produce products for export are more productive than firms 
that do not. Column (2) shows that older firms are more productive than firms that are less than 6 
years old (measured from the first time the firm appears in the panel dataset).
11 Column (3) 
indicates that productivity increases with firm size (measured by the number of employees). 
Column (4) shows that, relative to the Atlantic region, firms in the Central region and in Bogotá 
are more productive, while firms in the Oriental region and in Orinoquía and Amazonía are less 
                                                           
11 Given that we do not have firm’ age information, we assume that any firm appearing in 1982 is one year old, the 
first year of the panel. 
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 productive.
12 The last four columns of the table show the same results, but using TFPR instead of 
TFPQ. Firm size and whether or not the firm produces products for export have  signs consistent 
with those reported for TFPQ, but not always significant values. The geographic indicators report 
that firms in Bogotá have higher TFPR values than the Atlantic region, while firms in Orinoquía 
and Amazonía regions have lower TFPR values. This could indicate that perhaps there is regional 
heterogeneity in barriers that prevent plants from increasing the marginal products of capital and 
labor. 
Table 13 shows the dispersion of distortions, measured as the standard deviation      and 
    . The mean value for the standard deviation for      is 153, and the mean value for the 
standard deviation of      is 0.78. Across the years, the standard deviation for the capital 
distortion ranges from 59 to 660, while the standard deviation for the output distortion ranges 
from 0.37 to 1.70.      dispersion increases over time, and      dispersion although declining on 
average, shows a sharp increase in 1993. This suggests that the increase in variability in TFPR in 
the 1990s, could be driven mostly from output distortions rather than capital distortions. Figure 
11 shows a decline in the dispersion of      and      in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period of 
reduction in trade barriers and labor market reforms; and a sharp increase after 1991 the year 
during which the opening of the economy legislation was passed. This upward trend in      
dispersion continues after the passing of Law 100, which increased labor costs. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this paper we apply Hsieh and Klenow (2009) methodology to measuring misallocation and 
plant level manufacturing productivity in Colombia. We use a panel dataset with 74,392 plant-
year observations for industrial establishment. The period that we study goes from 1982 to 1998. 
We find that plants in Colombia have a wider TFPR dispersion than those in the United States, 
indicating greater misallocation of resources across plants.  
We hypothetically reallocate resources by equalizing TFPR across plants and within 
industries. The aggregate TFP gains that would result are between 47-55 percent. We compare 
the actual firm sizes to the size observed if TFPR were equalized. We find that in Colombia there 
                                                           
12 It is important to keep in mind that for the Orinoquía and Amazonía region there are only 22 firm-year 
observations in the dataset. The number of plant-year observations for the other regions are: Atlantic, 6,832; 
Oriental, 9,640; Central, 22,678; Pacific, 11,419; and Bogotá, 23,801. 
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 should be fewer mid-size plants and more small and large ones. In particular, we find that 
medium and large firms should increase their plant size. These results are consistent across years. 
We also show results from a scenario where Colombia would move to U.S. efficiency. This 
reallocation would result in aggregate TFP gains between 3-8 percent. We test for the robustness 
of our results by changing the elasticity of substitution between plant value added and the source 
of the labor and output shares. We find that using Colombian labor and output shares increases 
the gains from equalizing TFPR within industries; while using U.S. labor and output shares 
reduces the gains from equalizing TFPR within industries.  
    To the extent that changes in productivity are due to different policies being 
implemented, we show how TFPQ and TFPR dispersion relate to labor market, trade and 
financial policy changes and firm characteristics. While there is no clear causal evidence that 
trade and labor market reforms directly affected plants’ productivity, we see some indication of 
concurrent increases in productivity with reductions in dismissal costs, and of reductions in 
productivity with increases in health and pension contributions. Future work can focus on causal 
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1982 934 1,387 298 378 620 320 64 1,055 115 5,171
1983 942 1,417 302 360 589 293 66 991 112 5,072
1984 917 1,425 285 352 587 268 64 923 110 4,931
1985 899 1,449 266 338 603 254 65 922 98 4,894
1986 914 1,474 276 332 604 246 66 926 99 4,937
1987 940 1,455 290 328 609 249 64 920 98 4,953
1988 920 1,398 292 320 634 225 64 933 104 4,890
1989 945 1,339 300 331 621 220 65 925 99 4,845
1990 946 1,274 285 313 607 205 64 891 96 4,681
1991 888 1,181 255 297 588 188 60 823 81 4,361
1992 845 958 237 278 563 169 51 706 77 3,884
1993 827 908 214 268 548 165 53 733 76 3,792
1994 794 883 214 264 543 153 46 681 70 3,648
1995 852 872 220 270 547 166 43 702 80 3,752
1996 848 831 204 257 548 168 43 686 78 3,663
1997 868 813 195 248 540 168 36 653 71 3,592
1998 830 744 167 233 512 150 35 585 70 3,326
Total 15,109 19,808 4,300 5,167 9,863 3,607 949 14,055 1,534 74,392
Source: AMS Colombia 1982-1998. Authors calculations  
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 Table 2. Entry and Exit of Firms 
 
Note: The difference column indicates net entry. Net entry is calculated as 
the difference between firms that enter in year   minus firms that exit in year 
  1 . 
Year Exit Entry Difference
1982 802 - -
1983 721 703 -99
1984 642 580 -141
1985 547 605 -37
1986 543 590 43
1987 580 559 16
1988 563 517 -63
1989 508 518 -45
1990 590 344 -164
1991 849 270 -320
1992 504 372 -477
1993 600 412 -92
1994 520 456 -144
1995 515 624 104
1996 468 426 -89
1997 557 397 -71
1998 - 291 -266
Source: AMS Colombia 1982-1998. Authors calculations
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 Table 3. Size Distribution of Establishments in Colombia, 1998 

















10-19 953 953 28.65 28.65 13,367 13,367 4.56 4.56
20-49 1,052 2,005 31.63 60.28 32,452 45,819 11.07 15.63
50-99 604 2,609 18.16 78.44 42,460 88,279 14.49 30.12
100-249 463 3,072 13.92 92.36 71,743 160,022 24.48 54.59
250-499 170 3,242 5.11 97.47 58,068 218,090 19.81 74.41
500-999 60 3,302 1.80 99.28 41,746 259,836 14.24 88.65
1000 or more 24 3,326 0.72 100.00 33,272 293,108 11.35 100.00








 Table 4. Dispersion of ln(TFPQ) and ln(TFPR) 
Year 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
S.D. 1.77 1.82 1.70 1.81 2.43 1.78 1.88 1.83 1.70 1.60 1.82 1.84 2.08 1.98 2.07 2.01 2.14
75-25 2.52 2.52 2.32 2.46 2.81 2.64 2.75 2.64 2.43 2.37 2.43 2.58 2.83 2.82 2.58 2.71 2.58
90-10 4.55 4.93 4.49 4.86 6.14 4.74 5.00 4.89 4.41 4.37 4.76 4.74 5.36 5.12 5.27 5.20 5.51
S.D. 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.02 1.64 0.98 1.08 0.98 0.89 0.84 1.03 0.99 1.23 1.15 1.17 1.13 1.21
75-25 1.21 1.21 1.08 1.15 1.34 1.22 1.32 1.23 1.13 1.10 1.16 1.18 1.32 1.33 1.23 1.23 1.28
90-10 2.50 2.53 2.28 2.36 3.34 2.46 2.75 2.38 2.20 2.08 2.44 2.46 2.92 2.98 2.91 2.88 2.90
Source: AMS Colombia 1998, and authors' calculations.
Panel B: Dispersion of ln(TFPR)





Year σ=3 σ=3 σ=3 σ=5
US Labor Shares Col. Labor shares US Labor Shares US Labor Shares
Col. Output Shares Col. Output Shares US output shares Col. Output Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
82 48.85 83.36 41.36 75.46
83 47.26 78.37 41.55 70.30
84 48.83 84.55 42.60 76.49
85 48.12 82.27 42.06 74.51
86 51.21 77.66 42.84 74.67
87 48.53 77.86 43.11 72.27
88 54.49 87.02 44.67 90.49
89 48.82 78.60 43.75 76.93
90 47.07 73.83 45.71 77.22
91 48.02 78.56 45.44 77.56
92 49.94 78.30 44.96 87.62
93 50.84 79.05 46.14 81.77
94 54.40 80.01 51.91 85.36
95 51.64 79.00 49.98 84.41
96 48.67 77.29 46.06 78.12
97 50.47 77.44 - 82.93
98 50.53 73.34 - 78.64
Source: AMS Colombia 1982-1998. Authors calculations
Table 5.  TFP Gains from Equalizing TFPR within Industries 
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 Table 6. Percent of Plants, Actual Size vs. Efficient Size 
0-50% 50-100% 100-200% 200+%
Top Size Quartile 3.0 4.8 7.5 9.6
2nd Quartile 5.0 5.5 6.2 8.3
3rd Quartile 5.8 5.7 5.9 7.6
Bottom Quartile 12.3 5.0 3.8 3.9
Source: AMS Colombia 1998, and authors' calculations.  
 
 
Table 7. TFP Gains from Equalizing TFPR relative to 1997 U.S. Gains 




















Source: AMS Colombia 1982-1998. Authors calculations  
 
 
Table 8. Regressions of Inputs on Revenue, Revenue on Inputs 
Colombia US
Inputs on Revenue 0.92 1.01
Revenue on Inputs 0.95 0.82
Source: AMS Colombia 1982-1998. Authors calculations  
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Source: AMS Colombia 1982-1998. Authors calculations  
 
 
Table 10. Index of Mean Level of Value Added, Capital and Labor 
Index % change Index % change Index % change
1982 1.00 1.00 1.00
1983 1.24 0.24 1.60 0.60 0.97 -0.03
1984 1.57 0.27 2.44 0.53 0.96 0.00
1985 2.09 0.33 3.02 0.24 0.92 -0.05
1986 2.77 0.33 3.33 0.10 0.90 -0.02
1987 3.41 0.23 4.34 0.30 0.92 0.02
1988 4.70 0.38 5.72 0.32 0.93 0.01
1989 6.28 0.34 7.37 0.29 0.93 0.01
1990 8.57 0.36 10.27 0.39 0.97 0.04
1991 11.55 0.35 15.05 0.47 1.04 0.07
1992 13.60 0.18 22.29 0.48 1.14 0.10
1993 15.88 0.17 29.20 0.31 1.18 0.03
1994 22.58 0.42 42.52 0.46 1.22 0.04
1995 28.31 0.25 58.48 0.38 1.15 -0.05
1996 33.27 0.18 76.76 0.31 1.10 -0.04
1997 41.27 0.24 105.52 0.37 1.11 0.01
1998 50.76 0.23 130.58 0.24 1.10 -0.01
Source: AMS Colombia 1982-1998. Authors calculations
Year
Value Added Capital Labor
 























Observations 72,186 74,392 74,392
R-squared 0.130 0.010 0.000
Robust standard errors in brackets










 Table 12. Regressions of Sector TFPR and TRPQ on Firm and Geographical Characteristics 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Exporter 1.088*** 0.473*** 0.195*** 0.150***
[0.028] [0.036] [0.016] [0.020]
Age 6 - 10 0.191*** 0.006 0.018 -0.001
[0.040] [0.038] [0.022] [0.022]
Age 10 and more 0.414*** 0.041 0.053** 0.014
[0.043] [0.058] [0.023] [0.023]
Size 20-49 0.439*** 0.388*** 0.01 -0.009
[0.021] [0.022] [0.015] [0.016]
Size 50-99 1.006*** 0.923*** 0.099*** 0.075***
[0.028] [0.029] [0.019] [0.020]
Size 100-249 1.426*** 1.315*** 0.169*** 0.135***
[0.051] [0.049] [0.030] [0.030]
Size 250-499 1.599*** 1.452*** 0.085 0.036
[0.123] [0.119] [0.061] [0.062]
Size 500-999 2.122*** 1.820*** 0.212*** 0.121***
[0.043] [0.053] [0.026] [0.030]
Size 1000+ 2.338*** 2.084*** 0.237*** 0.150***









Orinoquia and Amazonia -0.545*** -0.316**
[0.176] [0.151]
Observations 72,186 74,392 74,392 72,186 72,186 74,392 74,392 72,186
R-squared 0.120 0.020 0.270 0.300 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.020
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1





Table 13. Dispersion of      and      
Year 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
S.D. 179.17 125.74 92.62 128.80 187.22 101.12 86.09 105.80 136.31 99.90 187.20 659.89 58.46 75.97 218.30 103.47 69.32
75-25 16.31 13.91 13.70 12.81 13.85 14.01 13.33 12.29 12.03 11.83 11.84 11.60 10.12 10.13 9.91 9.82 9.25
90-10 50.09 44.74 40.47 38.13 39.43 38.69 40.64 38.64 38.70 37.74 35.51 34.11 29.53 31.93 30.10 30.30 28.94
Year 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
S.D. 0.58 0.60 0.57 0.53 0.73 0.51 0.53 0.44 0.41 0.37 0.88 0.94 1.13 1.70 1.05 1.08 1.25
7 5 - 2 5 0 . 4 50 . 4 60 . 4 30 . 4 30 . 4 30 . 4 30 . 4 20 . 4 20 . 4 20 . 4 10 . 5 00 . 5 80 . 5 50 . 6 00 . 5 70 . 5 90 . 6 0
9 0 - 1 0 0 . 9 40 . 9 60 . 9 20 . 9 10 . 9 00 . 8 80 . 8 50 . 8 30 . 8 40 . 8 11 . 0 51 . 2 71 . 2 21 . 4 11 . 3 81 . 3 01 . 4 1
Source: AMS Colombia 1982-1998. Authors calculations
Panel B: Dispersion of τYsi
















































































Figure 2. Distribution of Labor Force across Activities 
Source: 1998 Colombian Household Survey, which includes information from 13 municipalities. 
Note: Informal employment is defined as people who are not affiliated with health insurance through employment. 
 Figure 3. Distribution of TFPQ 
 
 








Figure 4. Distribution of TFPQ in Colombia by Year 
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 Figure 6. Distribution of TFPR in Colombia by Year 
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 Figure 7. Distribution of Plant Size in 1998 
 
 





Figure 8. Distribution of Plant Size in Colombia by Year 
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 Figure 9. Dispersion of ln(TFPQ) and ln(TFPR) and Labor Reforms 
 
Note: The dotted blue lines indicate reductions in labor costs, while the solid red 
lines show increases. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on AMS Colombia 1982-1998.  
 
Figure 10: Dispersion of ln(TFPQ) and ln(TFPR) and Trade and Financial Reforms 
 
Note: The solid red line indicates reforms that increased trade protection, while the 
green dotted lines indicate trade liberalization and financial sector reforms.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on AMS Colombia 1982-1998.   
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 Figure 11: Dispersion of ln(    ) and ln(    ) and Trade and Financial Reforms 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on AMS Colombia 1982-1998. 
.    
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 Table A1. Appendix: U.S. and Colombian Output and Labor Shares for 1998 by 3-Digit ISIC Code 
Col. Output US. Output Col. Labor US. Labor
Share (%) Share (%) Share (%) Share (%)
311 Food manufacturing 17.19 7.27 16.69 52.42
312 Food manufacturing 3.35 1.10 17.80 36.14
313 Beverage industries 14.05 1.71 7.62 42.22
314 Tobacco Manuf.s 0.81 1.51 8.33 22.44
321 Manuf. of textiles 4.68 2.52 28.62 75.97
322 Manuf. of wearing apparel, except footwear 2.29 1.59 28.23 74.63
323 Manuf. of leather products of leather, substitutes and fur 0.51 0.19 28.81 74.43
324 Manuf. of footwear, except vulcanized or rubber or plastic footwear 0.82 0.12 25.09 74.17
331 Manuf. of wood and wood and cork products, except furniture 0.17 2.15 38.11 76.55
332 Manuf. of furniture and fixtures, except primarily of metal 0.37 1.80 35.63 76.26
341 Manuf. of paper and paper products 4.12 4.22 18.82 65.96
342 Printing, publishing and allied industries 2.34 7.64 24.67 67.39
351 Manuf. of industrial chemicals 3.86 3.14 12.76 41.96
352 Manuf. of other chemical products 10.82 8.20 17.26 34.49
353 Petroleum refineries 9.80 1.52 4.56 33.44
354 Manuf. of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal 0.57 0.33 8.24 48.92
355 Manuf. of rubber products 1.18 1.13 27.21 72.64
356 Manuf. of plastic products not elsewhere classified 4.58 3.25 21.77 64.83
361 Manuf. of pottery, china and earthenware 1.48 0.16 20.67 79.23
362 Manuf. of glass and glass products 1.77 0.61 18.80 62.39
369 Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products 3.79 1.49 13.31 62.25
371 Iron and steel basic industries 0.92 2.23 27.05 75.53
372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries 0.54 0.25 13.62 53.49
381 Manuf. of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 2.60 6.99 25.43 74.34
382 Manuf. of machinery except electrical 1.66 6.53 28.32 73.17
383 Manuf. of electrical machinery apparatus, appliances and supplies 2.12 15.57 29.33 69.85
384 Manuf. of transport equipment 2.42 10.83 23.78 59.32
385 Manuf. of professional and scientific equipment not elsewhere classified 0.33 4.40 21.82 64.12
390 Other Manufacturing Industries 0.87 1.58 21.65 66.86
Source: AMS Colombia 1982-1998. Authors calculations
Sector
ISIC 3 
Rev 2.
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